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Introduction
During the past 2 decades, more than six million people have applied for asylum in the European Union. In 2015, these figures rose dramatically and it is broadly believed that millions of asylum seekers will find their way to Europe in the nearest future.
1 Challenges posed by the volume of refugee flows have triggered an extended discussion and the current European asylum policy has widely been criticized as ineffective and, to a certain extent, unfair.
In the face of the refugee crises, numerous voices have advocated resettlement as a solution. Several scholars appeal to the concept of solidarity and burden-sharing and suggest a further harmonization of national asylum policies and more centralization (see, for example, Hatton, 2015 where further references can be found). Others, in contrast, have recommended paying more attention to market-based mechanisms.
A market-based solution in the context of refugee resettlement was initially proposed by researchers in the field of international law. Schuck (1997) and Hathaway and Neve (1997) were the first to discuss a system of bilateral negotiations over tradable refugee resettlement. In the system proposed by Hathaway and Neve (1997) , poorer states would agree to host refugees, while richer states would agree to finance the costs of refugee protection incurred by the host states. Schuck (1997) proposed a similar system in which states would first agree to quotas, based on national wealth or other criteria, for the number of refugees each is obligated to protect. Next, the participating states would be able to trade their quotas by paying others to fulfill their obligations. Bubb et al. (2011) supplemented this system of bilateral exchange with a screening device to separate refugees from economic migrants. Subsequently, Fernandez-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2014) proposed a multilateral system of tradable immigration quotas with a main application to the resettlement of long-standing refugees. In Fernandez-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2015) , they applied this idea to relocation of refugees and asylum seekers in the context of the European Union. These authors emphasized that, since 1 In 2015, more than 1.6 million people applied for asylum in the OECD countries and about a million additional asylum seekers were registered in the first eight months of 2016. The costs of hosting refugees in the OECD countries are substantial. Thus, for example, Germany, which in 2015 took in as many as 900,000 asylum seekers, spent on their hosting in that year 16 billion Euros (0.5% of GDP). Sweden, which admission of refugees and asylum seekers is costly and the costs vary across countries, from the point of view of receiving countries, efficiency gains could be achieved if refugees and asylum seekers were to be hosted where it is cheapest to host them.
This paper expands the literature on tradable refugee resettlement in the direction of human capital accumulation and growth. The analysis is performed in a growth model with endogenous fertility in the tradition of Galor and Tsiddon (1997) building on Azarnert (2010a) , where the effect of free education on fertility, private educational investment, and human capital accumulation was considered. 2 I show how refugee resettlement from a more advanced and wealthier country to a less advanced and less wealthy country, combined with financial transfers, increases utility of indigenous populations and stimulates human capital accumulation in both economies.
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The basic idea of this paper is as follows. Suppose that for some exogenous (humanitarian) reason the government of the wealthier economy is willing to provide asylum to a certain number of refugees. 4 If on average refugees are less skilled than the indigenous population, their arrival reduces the average level of human capital in the hosting economy, which reduces the rate of return on investment in human capital for the children's generation through a global or atmospheric externality. This in turn generates an incentive for the agents in the wealthier economy to finance income transfers to the agents in the less wealthy economy to make it worthwhile for them to host the resettled refugees in their own country. I propose a particular redistribution scheme and derive conditions for refugee resettlement combined with income transfers to increase utility of the local individuals in both economies. That is, there is Pareto improvement.
If transfers are financed by taxes levied on labor income of the agents in the wealthier economy and distributed in the form of subsidies to labor income of the agents took in 163,000 asylum seekers in 2015 (the highest per capita ratio ever registered in the OECD at 1.6% of total population) spent 6 billion Euros (1.35% of GDP).
in the less wealthy economy, income redistribution affects the agents' optimization with respect to the quantity and quality of their offspring. Taxation of labor income increases fertility and reduces per-child human capital investment of parents in the more developed, wealthier economy, thereby reducing the resulting per-capita human capital levels in this economy in the next period. In contrast, subsidies reduce fertility and increase parental investment in per-child human capital in the less wealthy economy, hence increasing the resulting per-capita human capital levels in this economy in the next period.
The effect of the relocation of refugees on human capital accumulation is twofold:
First, resettlement affects the shares of the relatively low-skilled offspring of the current period refugees in the society, reducing it in the wealthier economy and increasing it in the less wealthy economy. Second, through its effect on the average societal level of human capital in the current period (via the global human capital externality), resettlement contributes to a further increase in the average level of human capital in the wealthier economy in the next period, while reducing the next period's average level of human capital in the receiving economy.
I derive the exact conditions for the proposed resettlement policy to increase the average society-wide levels of human capital in both economies in the next period, thereby encouraging economic growth. Moreover, through transmission of human capital between successive generations the effect of the resettlement will evolve further from one generation to the next. The analysis thus suggests that current policies of asylum provision and refugee resettlement will have long lasting consequences for human capital accumulation and hence economic growth in the future.
Of course, a reduction in the average level of human capital in the host economy is not the major reason for an adverse effect of immigration from less developed countries on the local population in advanced economies. A more extensive list of the reasons includes, for instance, traditional economic reasons, such as a fiscal burden of immigration and labor market and welfare considerations, natives' perception that immigration gives rise to delinquency and social insecurity, and non-economic reasons, such as cultural differences and changes in the general nature of the community. See Hillman (1994) , Hillman and Weiss (1999) , Bauer et al. (2000) , O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006), Preston (2006, 2007) , Miguet (2008) , Facchini and Mayda (2008) , and Card et al. (2012) , among many others. Predictably, it has been found that across
European countries non-Western and, particularly Muslim immigrants, induce threat perceptions in the host society (e.g. Schneider, 2008; Green et al., 2010; Hjern and Nagayoshi, 2011), 5 and that immigrants of a different race/ethnicity to the native population appear to be perceived as being more likely to benefit from public funds than immigrants of the same race/ethnicity as the native population (Bridges and Mateut, 2014 among those who are formally in the labor force, unemployment is much higher than that among the indigenous population. The evidence also indicates that European-born 5 As to the popular concepts of multiculturalism and cultural enrichment, Gorinas (2014) notes that, for instance, in Denmark, the 2008 European Values Survey reveals that one of the biggest concerns associated with immigration is the undermining of the majority culture, and only 6% of the Danish population wishes that immigrants keep their customs and traditions. 6 For example, in 1996, the share of minority immigrants among income support recipients in Germany was 25.8%, while their share in the total population was less than 10%. In Western Germany, between 1991 and 1996 an increase in the number of minority immigrants was associated with an increase in real expenditures on income support by 141% (Riphahn, 2004) . It is also noteworthy that since 1994 these statistics exclude expenditures on asylum seekers. Ethnic German immigrants from Eastern Europe are considered in these statistics as German nationals. Similarly, in Sweden, an increase in the share of immigrants in the population from 7.6% to 10.8% between 1983 and 1996 was associated with an increase in real expenditure on social assistance by 170%, while by the mid-1990s immigrants accounted to nearly half of the country's expenditure on social assistance, up from less than one quarter of total expenditures in the early 1980s ). 7 Net transfers from indigenous Danes to the public sector in Dkr (1997 prices) per person increased from 14,900 in 1991 to 24,500 in 1998 (Nannestad, 2004, table 2) . The first estimate of the fiscal impact of immigration in Denmark published in December 1997 shows that the net cost of non-Western immigrants amounted to 11.3 billion Dkr in 1995 (Nannestad, 2007, note 27) . The ministry of finance has calculated that in 2016 the net cost of immigrants and their descendants was 28 billion Danish kroner, which amounted descendants of non-white immigrants have much lower employment and earnings and exhibit very high welfare dependency, relative to comparable natives. 8 Studies looking at the difference between refugees and economic immigrants generally conclude that refugees have significantly worse labor market outcomes (e.g. Yu et al., 2007; Aydemir, 2007; Wilkinson, 2008; Connor, 2010; Ott, 2013) .
Researchers have also presented evidence that immigration has an impact on crime, in particular, property crimes and robbery (Bianchi et al., 2012; Spenkuch, 2014) , and that asylum seekers are likely to have higher net returns to criminal activity than economic migrants (Bell et al., 2013) . Muslim immigration has been associated with an increased threat of terrorist attacks (Europol, 2017) . 9 It has also been shown that immigration pushes up housing rents (Saiz, 2007) , and that minority immigration causes the indigenous population to opt out of public schools for private education (Betts and Fairlie, 2003; Rangvid, 2010; Gerdes, 2013) , and relocate from immigrant-dense districts to other areas (Saiz and Wachter, 2011; Accetturo et al., 2014 and references therein).
For any reason that causes local agents to incur the costs associated with immigration from the less developed world, the effect is the same. This paper is about effects, not reasons.
Advanced countries have implemented refugee resettlement to cheaper destinations on several occasions. Thus, for example, in response to the 1994 exodus from Cuba, the United States persuaded Panama and several islands in the region to accept to about 1.5% of GDP. Using a computable general equilibrium model for Denmark, Schou (2006) shows that general immigration would worsen the Danish fiscal sustainability problem. 8 Nannestad (2004) reports that in Denmark more than 50% of nonwestern immigrants and their descendants were outside the labor force in 2001. The most striking are the figures for Somalis and Palestinians, for whom labor market participation rates were 14 and 26 percent respectively. During 1985 -2001, among immigrants and their Danish-born descendants, unemployment was at least 3 times greater than that among indigenous Danes. Similarly, Algan et al. (2010) report that in France, Germany and the UK, employment rates of second-generation, European-born immigrants of non-European ancestry were significantly lower than the employment rates of the indigenous populations in these countries. For most groups of non-European immigrants, the employment rates of the second-generation male immigrants were lower than the employment rates of the first-generation male immigrants. See also Blume and Verner (2007) on Denmark, There can be a concern that resettlement from rich Western democracies to poorer countries with less advanced welfare systems will be utility-reducing for the refugees. We therefore encounter the issue of the refugees' legal rights. It should be noted that, 
The Basic Structure of the Model
Consider an overlapping-generations economy, in which activity extends over an infinite discrete time. In every period the economy produces a single homogenous good using a constant-returns-to-scale technology with human capital as the only input. In each generation, agents live for two periods: childhood and adulthood. During childhood, individuals acquire human capital. During adulthood, they work, become parents and bring up their offspring. As parents, adult individuals allocate a positive fraction of their time to feeding and raising their children and invest in the education of their children.
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Suppose a world that consists of three entities: the most advanced, high-income economy denoted by A , the less advanced, middle-income economy denoted by B and the least advanced, low-income economy denoted by C . For some exogenous reason, in the most advanced, high-income economy A wages and the average level of human capital are higher than those in the less advanced, middle-income economy B . In turn, in economy B wages and the average level of human capital are higher than those in the least advanced, low-income economy C . In the following sections I present and analyze the effect of the refugee-type migration of relatively low-skilled individuals from the least advanced, poor economy C on the dynamics of human capital accumulation in the more advanced economies A and B . The analysis abstracts from the source economy C that is kept "outside the model". 
Migration and Redistribution
Suppose that in period t for some exogenous (humanitarian) reason the absentee government of the wealthiest economy A is willing to provide asylum for a certain number of refugees from the least advanced, poor economy C . Suppose that the refugees amount to an exogenously given fraction R of the sending economy's working-age population.
12 Also suppose that on average the refugees are less skilled than the indigenous populations in the more advanced economies A and B . These refugees can all be absorbed in the wealthiest economy A . Alternatively, a fraction ] 1 , 0 ]   of them can be resettled to the middle-income economy B . In the latter case, the population in economy B should be compensated for the in-migration-driven negative externality. To specify the redistribution scheme, the following is assumed:
A1. In period t there is one common tax at rate t  levied on the labor income of any individual in economy A .
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A2.
The proceeds are distributed proportionally to the labor income of any individual in economy B at rate t s .
The exact condition for the balanced budget is shown below in Section 2.7.
To specify the pattern of migration, suppose that young individuals from the poor economy C seek for refuge in the very beginning of the second period of life. If the refugees are resettled to economy B , their migration to economy A is prohibited. The admitted refugees work, become parents, bring up and educate their offspring at the host economy.
The formation of human capital
In any period t , an adult individual born in Tamura (1991) , the assumption that the average level of human capital in society is an input in the production of human capital for each individual became common in the literature. This externality has been utilized, for example, by Tamura (1996) , Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Morand (1999) , Viaene and Zilcha (2002) , de la Croix and Doepke (2003), Azarnert (2008 Azarnert ( , 2010a , among many others. A particular form of human capital production function is specified below in equation (8).
Since economy C is "outside the model", in the next sections I consider only individuals who were born or admitted as refugees in economies A and B . Therefore, there are three types of individuals in the model: (1) a , individuals born in the wealthiest economy A , (2) b , individuals born in the less wealthy economy B , (3) r , individuals born in the poor economy C , who were accepted as refugees either in economy A or B .
The optimization of parents
Agents of any type derive utility from their own consumption in adulthood and from the total future income of their children. 13 The utility function of an individual of any type 
The right-hand side of equation (3) represents an adult's income, which is allocated between consumption and the total cost of rearing children. Given the redistribution scheme, as defined in Section 2.1, 0   for a refugee.
The total future income of the individual's offspring is:
Quantity -quality tradeoff
From optimization, an adult's consumption is
That is, a fraction
of an adult's net full income is devoted to consumption and hence a fraction  is devoted to childrearing.
In order to allocate resources between children's quantity and quality, an adult makes two simultaneous decisions. First, he decides how much consumption to forego during his adulthood to rear a family. Second, he decides what amount of resources to invest in the education of his children to increase their skill level.
For an individual of any type in the case of a non-corner solution, the standard condition of setting the marginal rate of substitution between quality and quantity equal to the price implies that The next subsection discusses the solution for the parents' optimization problem for a particular form of the human capital production function.
Choice of fertility and investment in education
To characterize optimal choices of fertility and investment in education, suppose that in either economy all children born in this economy have access to the same technology of human capital production:
This learning technology implies that children of the refugees from economy C born in the host economy become similar to the indigenous population of that economy. 
so that, according to (9),
Given the amount of resources allocated to children's education, the desired
14 An assumption that
ensures that all parents invest in the education of their children.
Equation (9) shows that the optimal choice of investment in the offspring's education and hence the children's human capital levels (Eq. 10) is positively related to the parent's human capital, although parental human capital does not enter the learning technology directly. Equation (11) displays the traditional negative relationship between the parental level of human capital and the choice of fertility.
Furthermore, from equations (9) to (11) , subsidies given to agents in economy B , increase quality and reduce quantity of their offspring. Similarly, redistribution reduces adults' own consumption in economy A and increases consumption in economy B (Eq. 5).
Refugee resettlement, redistribution and utility
By construction in this model, the wages and the average levels of human capital in the more advanced economies A and B are higher than those in the least advanced economy (8) with respect to the average level of human capital in the society, the decline in the average level of human capital in the economy where the refugees are accepted will be associated with a reduction in the individual levels of human capital of the offspring of the indigenous agents in this economy. Hence, the resulting reduction in the parental levels of utility generates an incentive for the agents in the wealthiest economy A to finance transfers to the agents in the less wealthy economy B to make it worthwhile for them to admit the resettled refugees. Therefore, with the redistribution scheme, as specified above in Section 2.1, the utility levels of the agents in economy A in the case with taxation and the refugee resettlement 
. 16 To derive this rate of the subsidy, note that 0 0 , , , ,
if the following condition holds:
If these conditions do not hold, i.e., inequalities (12) and (13) are reversed, the agents in economies A and B can be worse off with redistribution and refugee resettlement.
Refugee resettlement and human capital accumulation
This section analyzes the dynamic behavior of the society's average level of human capital. To characterize the effect of asylum migration and refugee resettlement on the inter-temporal evolution of human capital, I examine the effect of migration in period t on the average level of human capital in the next period, in which migration is impossible. 
The average human capital level in period 1  t is defined as
Given the number of the refugees as supposed in Section 2.1 and the number of children and the levels of human capital investment among the three types of agents as determined in Section 2.5, the average human capital level in economy A in period 1  t in the case of resettlement of a fraction  of the refugees is
while the average level of human capital in the case when all refugees are settled in economy A is correspondingly
Similarly, the average level of human capital in economy B in period 1  t with refugee resettlement and income transfers is
while the corresponding average level of human capital in the absence of resettlement and income transfers is
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As shown previously, taxation of labor income increases fertility and reduces perchild human capital investment in the indigenous population in economy A , thereby reducing the resulting per-capita human capital levels in this economy in the next period.
At the same time, the effect of the resettlement of the refugees is twofold: First, through the reduction in the total number of the offspring of the current period refugees, it reduces the share of the relatively low-skilled agents in economy A in the next period. Second, it is also associated with an increase in the average level of human capital in the society in the current period, which increases the rate of return on investment in human capital for the entire children's generation, thus further contributing to an increase in the average level of human capital in economy A in the next period. The net effect is thus uncertain. Comparing the levels of human capital in the case of resettlement ( (18) and (19) , allows us to determine precisely whether resettlement of a fraction of the refugees in this country coupled with the subsidies to the labor income of the local agents in period t in economy B increases or decreases the average level of human capital in period 1  t .
As a consequence, if for a given  , are established in Appendix. Moreover, as follows from the property of the learning technology (8) with respect to the average level of human capital in the society, the effect of the resettlement on human capital levels in each of the economies will evolve further from one generation to the next.
Conclusion
In view of the large and growing number of asylum seekers who find their way to developed countries, numerous voices have advocated resettlement as a possible solution.
This paper expands the literature on tradable refugee resettlement in the direction of human capital accumulation and growth. The analysis is performed in a growth model with endogenous fertility. I have proposed a particular redistribution scheme and show that refugee resettlement from a more advanced and wealthier economy to a less advanced and less wealthy economy combined with income transfers can give rise to conditions in which utility of the indigenous populations in both countries increases. I have also derived the exact conditions for the proposed resettlement policy to stimulate human capital accumulation and hence economic growth in both economies. 
Appendix. Conditions for  that guarantees
